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NOTES
"DAMAGES OR NOTHING"-THE EFFICACY OF
THE BIVENS-TYPE REMEDY
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics,1 plaintiff sued federal law enforcement agents for damages resulting from an allegedly unconstitutional search and arrest. 2 In a dramatic departure from received law, the Supreme
Court inferred a cause of action from the fourth amendment itself. 3 As the Second Circuit has noted, "[flew opinions have
stirred as much debate as Bivens. '' 4 Commentators have extensively analyzed the case and its ramifications. 5 Courts have wrestled with new issues it spawned, such as the possibility of inferring
damage remedies from amendments other than the fourth' or of
obtaining relief from nonfederal defendants.'

1 403

U.S. 388 (1971).

2 Specifically, plaintiff charged that "the arrest and search were effected without a

warrant, ... unreasonable force was employed in making the arrest ....[and] the arrest
was made without probable cause." Id. at 389.
' Id. at 395-97.
4 Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (dictum), vacated sub nor.
City of West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554, cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 586 (1978).
5 See, e.g., Dellinger, Of Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 85 HARV. L.
REv. 1532 (1972); Freed, Executive Official Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis
and a Critique, 72 Nw. L. REv. 526 (1977); Lehmann, Bivens and its Progeny: The Scope of a
Constitutional Cause of Action for Torts Committed by Government Officials, 4 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 531 (1977); Comment, Sovereign Immunity-An Anathema to the "ConstitutionalTort," 12
SANTA CLARA LAW. 543 (1972); Note, Measuring Damagesfor Violations of Individuals' Constitutional Rights, 8 VAL. U. L. REv. 356 (1974).
6 See, e.g., Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978) (fifth amendment); Davis
v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.) (en banc), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643 (1979) (fifth
amendment); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1977) (fourteenth amendment); White
v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077 (4th Cir. 1976) (first amendment); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47
(4th Cir. 1975) (thirteenth and fourteenth amendments); Patmore v. Carlson, 392 F. Supp.
737 (E.D. Ill.
1975) (fifth and eighth amendments).
7 See, e.g., Turpin v. Mailet, 579 F.2d 152 (2d Cir.) (en banc) (municipality), vacated sub
nom. City of West Haven v. Turpin, 99 S. Ct. 554, cert. denied, 99 S.Ct. 586 (1978); Molina
v. Richardson, 578 F.2d 846 (9th Cir.) (municipality), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 724 (1978);
Monks v. Hetherington, 573 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1978) (private persons); Jamison v.
McCurrie, 565 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977) (municipality); Kostka v. Hogg, 560 F.2d 37 (1st
Cir. 1977) (town police chief); Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir.
1977) (municipality); Reeves v. City of Jackson, 532 F.2d 491 (5th Cir. 1976) (municipality
and employees); Cox v. Stanton, 529 F.2d 47 (4th Cir. 1975) (municipality); Skehan v.
Board of Trustees, 501 F.2d 31 (3d Cir. 1974) (state college), vacated on other grounds, 421
U.S. 983 (1975).
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Despite appearances, the Court did not decide Bivens to complicate the law, but to compensate victims of unconstitutional official acts. As Justice Harlan, concurring, explained:
[S]ome form of damages is the only possible remedy for someone in Bivens' alleged position. It will be a rare case indeed in
which an individual in Bivens' position will be able to obviate
the harm by securing injunctive relief from any court....
[A]ssuming Bivens' innocence of the crime charged, the
"exclusionary rule" is simply irrelevant. For people in Bivens'
shoes, it is damages or nothing.8

A Bivens-type9 action, therefore, accomplishes its purpose only
when a deserving plaintiff' ° recovers damages.

403 U.S. at 409-10 (emphasis added). See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485-86
(1978) (dictum); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254-55 (1978) (dictum).
Lehmann, supra note 5, argues that Bivens reflects a policy of access to the federal
courts. Id. at 539-40. He confuses the means with the end. Absent a corresponding right to
relief, a plaintiff needs no day in court; Lehmann's theory cannot justify expending judicial
resources.
Deterrence of unconstitutional official conduct is another possible rationale for Bivens.
See, e.g., Mashaw, Civil Liability of Government Officers: PropertyRights and Official Accountability, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 8, 9 (1978). Cf. Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th
Cir. 1978) (dictum) (joint policies of compensation and deterrence). Some deterrent effect
inheres in a compensatory award and recovery. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 256-57
(1978). The Court's description of the Bivens cause of action, however, precludes deterrence from being a primary goal. As one commentator has noted:
To effectively deter unconstitutional searches, a constitutional cause of action
for damages must focus on the conduct of the defendant, not on measurable
harm to the plaintiff. Unconstitutional searches must result in recoveries sufficient to prevent similar future misconduct regardless of a plaintiff's inability to
demonstrate either actual damage or malicious intent. But unfortunately the
Court characterizes the cause of action recognized in Bivens as compensatory, a
remedy affording recoveries when a plaintiff can "demonstrate an injury."
1972 UTAH L. REV. 276, 281 (footnotes omitted). To the extent that the deterrence
rationale does underlie Bivens, it, like the compensation rationale, is vindicated only if deserving plaintiffs recover on the cause of action.
I A Bivens action derives specifically from the fourth amendment. A Bivens-type action
is one alleging a violation of any constitutional amendment, including the fourth.
10 A plaintiff is deserving if (1) federal officials have violated his constitutional rights
and (2) a court recognizes a Bivens-type action for loss of those rights. Many plaintiffs fail
to meet these criteria. See Table B infra. Courts, increasingly sensitive to attempted constitutionalization of all injuries, may refuse to accord constitutional significance to some
harms caused by federal officials. See, e.g., Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 799-800 (5th
Cir. 1978) (en banc), rev'd, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643 (1979). Cf. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699710 (1976) (state official's defamatory publication does not violate procedural due process
or right to privacy).
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I
OBSTACLES TO RECOVERY

A plaintiff whose constitutional rights have been violated by a
federal official may name a variety of parties as defendants: the
official himself, his superiors, the employing department or
agency, or the United States. Regardless of their choices, however,
deserving plaintiffs almost always go uncompensated because they
cannot surmount an unusual array of hurdles to judgment and
recovery.
A. Suits Against the United States
Without an explicit waiver, the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars actions for money damages against the United States or a
federal agency."
No statute comprehensively waives sovereign
immunity for constitutional tort suits arising out of federal officials' conduct. The federal question jurisdication statute'" and the
Tucker Act 13 are jurisdictional1 4 only; they do not constitute

11 See United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 152-58 (1963) (dictum); Blackmar v.
Guerre, 342 U.S. 512, 515 (1952).
12 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976).
13 Id. §§ 1346(a), 1491.
14 Typically, § 1331(a) is the basis for district court subject-matter jurisdiction over
Bivens-type actions. See, e.g., Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 547 (1972)
(dictum). The Tucker Act provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the
Court of Claims, of:
(2) Any other civil action or claim against the United States, not exceeding
$10,000 in amount, founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive department, or upon any express or
implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976). Section 1491 vests exclusive federal subject-matter jurisdiction
in the Court of Claims for the same class of cases where the amount in controversy exceeds
$10,000.
The Second Circuit has indicated that a district court may exercise Tucker Act jurisdiction over a Bivens-type action against the United States. See Duarte v. United States, 532
F.2d 850, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1976) (dictum). In the same year, the Ninth Circuit held both
that a district court may and that it may not exercise such jurisdiction. Compare Wiren v.
Eide, 542 F.2d 757, 760 (9th Cir. 1976) with Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo,
533 F.2d 455, 465 (9th Cir. 1976). Kirkemo ruled the Tucker Act inapplicable to Bivens-type
actions because they fall within the "sounding in tort" exception to the jurisdictional grant.
Id. By treating the tort exception as a limit on each of the bases for jurisdiction, however,
this interpretation reads the internal punctuation out of the statute. The Court of Claims
has held that the Tucker Act provides jurisdiction over suits arguably sounding in tort if
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waivers of immunity. 15 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has suggested that the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA), 16 following its amendment in 1974,'" waives sovereign
immunity for all constitutional tort claims.' 8 But Congress limited
the reach of the 1974 amendment to intentional fourth amendment violations.' 9 Congress has, albeit unsystematically, waived
they also arise under the Constitution, federal statutes or regulations, or a contract. See,
e.g., Bird & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 1051, 1053-54 (Ct. Cl. 1970); Fort Sill
Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 355 F.2d 636, 637-38 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
For a discussion of early Bivens-type cases exploring possible bases for subject-matter
jurisdiction, see Lehmann, supra note 5, at 552 n.146.
'- Section 1331(a): Cale v. City of Covington, 586 F.2d 311, 313-14 (4th Cir. 1978);
Smith v. Grimm, 534 F.2d 1346, 1351 n.6 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976); Beale
v. Blount, 461 F.2d 1133, 1138 (5th Cir. 1972). Tucker Act: United States v. Testan, 424
U.S. 392, 397-98 (1976); Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850, 851-52 (2d Cir. 1976).
16 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1976).
In April 1973, federal narcotics agents allegedly invaded an apartment in Collinsville, Illinois, held the occupants at gunpoint, threatened to shoot them, and caused
extensive property damage before realizing that they had entered the wrong dwelling. A
short time later, using similar tactics, the same agents raided a nearby house with the same
result. No warrants were issued prior to either raid. See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, The
Federal Tort Claims Act Intentional Torts Amendment: An Interpretative Analysis, 54 N.C. L. REv.
497, 500-05 (1976).
In response to the Collinsville raids, Congress amended the FTCA to include intentional fourth amendment violations. See S. REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973),
reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2789. Prior to 1974, § 2680(h) excepted
specified intentional torts from the FTCA's waiver of immunity. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h)
(1970). The 1974 amendment qualified this exception by making the FTCA applicable to
"any claim arising ... out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of
process, or malicious prosecution" committed by "investigative or law enforcement officers
of the United States Government." Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-253, § 2, 88
Stat. 50.
18 Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America, 564 F.2d 531, 539-40 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dictum).
Accord, Mahoney v. Waddle, 564 F.2d 1018, 1060 (3d Cir. 1977) (dictum) (dissenting opinion, Garth, J.), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 904 (1978). Other courts have concluded that constitutional torts are not excepted from, and are therefore actionable under the FTCA. See
Founding Church of Scientology v. Director, FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748 (D.D.C. 1978); Avery
v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 937, 945-46 (D. Conn. 1977). But see Birnbaum v. United
States, 588 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978) (constitutional torts outside FTCA), rev'g 436 F.
Supp. 967 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
'9 "[T]he Committee amendment would submit the Government to liability whenever
its agents act under color of law so as to injure the public through searches and seizures
that are conducted without warrants or with warrants issued without probable cause." S.
REP. No. 93-588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2789, 2791. The text of the statute itself should have foreclosed the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' position. See note 17 infra.
Looking beyond the language of the 1974 amendment, however, the D.C. Circuit's
result may be defensible. State law determines governmental liability under the FTCA (28
U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (1976)) and if states must provide a Bivens-type remedy, Bivens it
might constitute state law for FTCA purposes. If the Supreme Court had decided Bivens
on constitutional grounds it clearly would have bound the states. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367
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sovereign immunity for a few other constitutional torts.2 0 Outside

U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (remedies compelled by fourth amendment are binding on states).
But the Court repudiated this view:
[W]e cannot accept respondents' formulation of the question as whether the
availability of money damages is necessary to enforce the Fourth Amendment.
For we have here no explicit congressional declaration that persons injured by a
federal officer's violation of the Fourth Amendment may not recover money
damages from the agents, but must instead be remitted to another remedy,
equally effective in the view of Congress. The question is merely whether
petitioner, if he can demonstrate an injury consequent upon the violation by
federal agents of his Fourth Amendment rights, is entitled to redress his injury
through a particular remedial mechanism normally available in the federal
courts.
403 U.S. at 397. See Davis v. Passman, 571 F.2d 793, 796-97 (5th Cir.), rev'd on other
grounds, 47 U.S.L.W. 4643 (1979); P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 798-800 (2d ed.
1973); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES §§ 26.00, at 574 & 26.00-1 (1976).
Nevertheless, Bivens may bind the states as constitutional common law. See Monaghan,
The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1,
23-24, 24 n.125 (1975). But see Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327-28 (2d Cir.
1978).
Even if the District of Columbia Circuit's interpretation was correct, the FTCA does
not guarantee a judgment for deserving plaintiffs; it merely authorizes governmental liability "in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976). Even though the United States is the defendant,
FTCA plaintiffs face some of the obstacles that prevent recovery from individual defendants (see notes 22-142 and accompanying text infra). See, e.g., Norton v. United States, 581
F.2d 390 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 613 (1978) (in FTCA action for fourth amendment violations by federal law enforcement agents, United States can invoke qualified immunity defense available to individual officers), rev'g 427 F. Supp. 138, 146-52 (E.D. Va.
1977). But see Crain v. Krehbiel, 443 F. Supp. 202, 215-16 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Moreover, the FTCA imposes unusual procedural requirements including a two-year
limitations period for presenting a claim to the appropriate federal agency (28 US.C.
§ 2401(b) (1976)) with final agency disposition a prerequisite to suit (§ 2675). It allows no
punitive damages (§ 2674), and limits attorneys' fees (§ 2678). By excepting "discretionary"
acts from the FTCA's purview, section 2680(a) probably excludes most constitutional tort
suits. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 98 S. Ct. 2894, 2910 (1978) (dictum); Midwest Growers
Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 465 (9th Cir. 1976); Ostrer v. Aronwald, 434 F.
Supp. 379, 382-83 (S.D.N.Y.) (dictum) (prosecutor's decision to use coercive means to induce witness to testify falls within discretionary act exception), aff'd on other grounds, 567
F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1977); Freed, supra note 5, at 544-45 n.98; Comment, supra note 5, 12
SANTA CLARA LAW. at 551. But see Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 329 (2d Cir.
1978) (distinguishing unconstitutional activities which fall outside agency's properly delegated functions, to which the discretionary act exception does not apply, from those within
authority, as to which court reached no decision). If plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a judgment against the government, however, payment of damages is guaranteed. 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 724a (West Supp. 1978).
20 In addition to claims alleging intentional fourth amendment violations (see note 19
and accompanying text supra), Congress has, for example, authorized suits against the
United States for discrimination in federal employment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976) (Tide VII).
A plaintiff cannot use such a waiver in conjunction with a Bivens-type theory; the statute
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these limited instances, however, sovereign immunity continues to
bar Bivens-type actions against the United States. 1
B. Suits Against Federal Officials
The sovereign immunity bar relegates plaintiffs with Bivenstype claims to suing individual federal officials. In such suits, prerequisites to judgment and recovery that are unrelated to demonstrating a compensable constitutional injury frequently prevent
satisfaction of meritorious claims.
1. Proper Defendants
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply in
Bivens-type actions against federal officials. Courts will base liability only on an official's direct responsibility for acts violating plaintiff's rights. 2 Plaintiff may not sue top-level personnel that he
waives immunity only for the statutory right of action. See Norton v. United States, 581
F.2d 390, 393-95 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 613 (1978). Title VII, the exclusive remedy for suits alleging federal employment discrimination (Brown v. General Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976)), precludes Bivens-type suits. See Beio v. EEOC, 446 F.
Supp. 171, 173-74 (D.D.C. 1978); Pace v. Mathews, 15 Fair Empl. Prac Cas. 703, 703-04
(D.D.C. 1978); Beeman v. Middendorf, 425 F. Supp. 713, 715-16 (D.D.C. 1977). But see
Brosnahan v. Eckerd, 435 F. Supp. 26 (D.D.C. 1977). Moreover, courts may refuse to infer
a cause of action from a constitutional amendment if an adequate statutory remedy exists.
See, e.g., Torres v. Taylor, 456 F. Supp. 951, 954-55 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no damage remedy
inferred from fifth and eighth amendments because FTCA adequate); Neely v.
Blumenthal, 458 F. Supp. 945, 960 (D.D.C. 1978) (no cause of action inferred from Constitution for employment discrimination because Title VII adequate). In any event, plaintiffs are compelled to rely on the statutory remedy, if one exists, and are subject to the
corresponding statutory procedures, which may hinder recovery. See note 19 supra.
2 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-05 (1978) (dictum); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 410 (1971) (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.); Jaffee v. United States, No. 78-2041, slip op. at 9-10 (3d Cir. Feb. 9,
1979); Norton v. United States, 581 F.2d 390, 393 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 613
(1978); Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1362-63 (9th Cir.),
cert. granted, 99 S. Ct. 613 (1978); Duarte v. United States, 532 F.2d 850, 852 (2d Cir.
1976); Terrapin Leasing, Ltd. v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 7, 8 (W.D. Okla. 1978); Smith
v. Commissioner, 78-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. 9,326 (N.D. Ga. 1978); Donohue v. United States,
437 F. Supp. 836, 842-43 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Smallwood v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 398,
405, 407 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd mem., 486 F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973); Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio
v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp. 1249, 1253-54 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd mem., 497 F.2d
683-86 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021 (1974).
22 See, e.g., Kite v. Kelley, 546 F.2d 334, 337-38 (10th Cir. 1976); Black v. United
States, 534 F.2d 524, 527-28 (2d Cir. 1976); Fayerweather v. Bell, 447 F. Supp. 913, 916
(M.D. Pa. 1978); Marquez v. Kiley, 436 F. Supp. 100, 105 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Jackson v.
Wise, 385 F. Supp. 1159, 1162-63 (D. Utah 1974); Green v. Laird, 357 F. Supp. 227, 230
(N.D. Il. 1973). Respondeat superior is also unavailable in suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976), Bivens' statutory counterpart for suits against state and local governments and offi-
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can readily identify once he determines which federal agency deprived him of his rights. Supervisory officers are properly defendants only if they participated or acquiesced in the purported
misconduct of their subordinates. " 3 Plaintiff must ferret out the
24
directly responsible officials themselves.
Identifying the officials who violated plaintiff's rights may
pose an insurmountable hurdle. An obviously problematic area,
not limited to constitutional tort cases, is the mass tort. Unless a
supervisory official has personal responsibility for en masse constitutional offenses,2 5 a deserving plaintiff may be precluded from
recovery because he cannot identify the official who injured him
with sufficient particularity. 2" Involvement of the federal
bureaucracy in the deprivation of plaintiff's rights compounds
identification difficulties. Bureaucratic decisionmaking is often
anonymous at all but the uppermost levels.
Many plaintiffs must file complaints naming "unknown" officials as defendants.2 7 Some courts readily dismiss unnamed decials (see note 65 infra). See Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 691-95
(1978) (municipalities); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033-34 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1033 (1973) (officials).
Vicarious liability would increase the deterrent effect generated by a damage recovery
by providing the superior with incentive to prevent his underlings from engaging in unlawful behavior. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS 459 (4th ed. 1971);
James, Vicarious Liability, 28 TUL.L. REv. 161, 168 (1954). Judicial imposition of liability for
fault resulting in injury only harmonizes with a compensatory purpose.
23 See cases cited in note 22 supra.
24 If the offending official dies, plaintiff may proceed against his estate. See Dobbs v.
Huff, 446 F. Supp. 35, 36-37 (N.D. Ga. 1977). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d)(1),
which authorizes automatic substitution of a deceased official's successor as defendant in a
lawsuit, is inapplicable because it is explicitly limited to officials sued in their official capacity. Bivens-type suits reach officials in their individual capacity. See note 91 infra.
The Seventh Circuit has held that a Bivens-type action survives the death of the injured party. See Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 672-75 (7th Cir. 1978) (applying federal
common law); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 332-34 (7th Cir. 1977) (borrowing state
law), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
25 E.g., Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916
(1978) (Capitol Police chief who supervised mass arrests of demonstrators liable for violations of first amendment rights).
26 Cf. Verkuil, Immunity or Responsibilityfor Unconstitutional Conduct: The Aftermath of
Jackson State and Kent State, 50 N.C. L. REv. 548, 556-57 (1972) (state officials). Even in
face-to-face encounters with the public, officials may retain their anonymity. Federal agents
arrested Webster Bivens, yet he initially sued "unknown" defendants. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 390 n.2.
27 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. at 390 n.2; Lowe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1293 (4th Cir. 1978); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 332 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); J.D. Pflaumer, Inc.
v. United States Dep't of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1128 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lofland v.
Meyers, 442 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Vorhauer v. United States, 426 F. Supp.
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fendants.18 Others, more sensitive to the indentification problem,
have refused to dismiss claims against John Doe defendants until
plaintiff has had an adequate opportunity to identify allegedly responsible officials through discovery. 2 9 Discovery, however, may
fail to uncover proper defendants. In addition, even if plaintiff
identifies proper defendants during discovery, his motion to
amend the complaint to name them may not relate back to the
original pleading, thereby re-exposing his suit to the time bar.30
Identification problems, therefore, may prove dispositive.
Moreover, the frequency of their occurrence and the uncertainty
they produce may discourage the prosecution of legitimate
Bivens-type claims.
2. PersonalJurisdiction
Once he identifies the proper officials, plaintiff faces the
hurdle of personal jurisdiction. 3 1 If any defendants reside out-

839, 840 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 879 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 56 (D.D.C. 1975); Dupree v. Village of Hempstead, 401 F.
Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 954 (E.D.N.Y.
1975); Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499, 501 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Ghandi v. Police Dep't of
Detroit, 66 F.R.D. 385, 386 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Jackson v. Wise, 385 F. Supp. 1159, 1161
(D. Utah 1974); Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1392 (N.D. Ill. 1974); Butler v.
United States, 365 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 & n.6 (D. Hawaii 1973); Reese v. Nixon, 347 F.
Supp. 314, 315 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
28 See, e.g., Black v. United States, 534 F.2d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 1976); Lofland v. Meyers,
442 F. Supp. 955, 959, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 879
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Dupree v. Village of Hempstead, 401 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D.N.Y.
1975). Local court. rules may require this result. See Reese v. Nixon, 347 F. Supp. 314, 315
(C.D. Cal. 1972); C.D. CAL. R. 4(i).
29 See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. at 390 n.2 (noting use of discovery to determine defendants' identities); J.D. Pflaumer,
Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 450 F. Supp. 1125, 1136 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Lowenstein
v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); Saffron v. Wilson, 70 F.R.D. 51, 56
(D.D.C. 1975).
30 See Bennett v. Campbell, 564 F.2d 329, 332 (9th Cir. 1977).
31 Of course, plaintiff must also effect service of process on defendants. See 2 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACrICE
4.02[3], at 4-44 (2d ed. 1978). If the officials reside in the forum state,
plaintiff must comply with FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d) (1) or (7). Rule 4(d)(5), governing service on
"an officer or agency of the United States," is inapplicable because it is limited to suits
against officials in their official capacity (see Griffith v. Nixon, 518 F.2d 1195, 1196 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975)), whereas Bivens-type defendants are sued in their
personal capacity. See ReIf v. Gasch, 511 F.2d 804, 808 n.18 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Green v.
Laird, 357 F. Supp. 227, 229 (N.D. Ill. 1973). See also note 91 infra.
Service requirements for nonresident defendants vary with the basis of personal jurisdiction. See note 33 and accompanying text infra. Locating the defendant, necessary where
personal service is required, may be unusually difficult in the Bivens context because federal employment frequently involves transfer. See J. HAWKINS, THE UNCLE SAM! CONNEC-
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side the forum state, 2 either state law or a pertinent federal statute may overcome that hurdle. 33 But although state long-arm
statutes generally will grant personal jurisdiction in Bivens-type
4
cases, nonresident defendants sometimes elude their grasp.
Courts disagree about whether any federal statute fills this
35
gap. The most likely candidate is 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e):
A civil action in which a defendant is an officer or
employee of the United States or any agency thereof acting in
his official capacity or under color of legal authority, or any
agency of the United States, or the United States, may, except
as otherwise provided by law, be brought in any judicial district
in which (1) a defendant in the action resides, or (2) the cause
of action arose, or (3) any real property involved in the action is
situated, or (4) the plaintiff resides if no real property is involved in the action....
The summons and complaint in such an action shall be
served as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure exTION 111-14 (1976). Statistical data on geographic transfers of federal employees are not
conveniently available. See Letter of Dr. Philip A.D. Schneider, Assistant Director of Workforce Information, United States Civil Service Commission (Oct. 6, 1978) (on file at the
Cornell Law Review). Courts may be unsympathetic to plaintiffs' inability to locate defendants. See Felder v. Daley, 403 F. Supp. 1324, 1326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dismissing Bivens
claim against federal agent where plaintiff was unable to locate defendant even though
U.S. Attorney could have located him).
32 District courts also recognize limits on their exercise of personal jurisdiction over
in-state defendants (see R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, MATERIALS FOR A BASIC
COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 768-69 (4th ed. 1978)), but no reported Bivens-type case con-

siders this issue.
33 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e) provides:

Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court thereunder provides for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state in which the
district court is held, service may be made under the circumstances and in the
manner prescribed by the statute or order, or, if there is no provision therein
prescribing the manner of service, in a manner stated in this rule. Whenever a
statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is held provides
(1) for service of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons
upon a party not an inhabitant of or found within the state, or (2) for service
upon or notice to him to appear and respond or defend in an action by reason
of the attachment or garnishment or similar seizure of his property located
within the state, service may in either case be made under the circumstances
and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
U See Marsh v. Kitchen, 480 F.2d 1270, 1272-74 (2d Cir. 1973); Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430
F. Supp. 1328, 1330-31 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 870-75
(N.D. Cal. 1976); Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 375 F.
Supp. 318, 320-25 (S.D.N.Y.), modified, 510 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1974); Rimar v. McCowan,
374 F. Supp. 1179, 1182-83 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
35 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (1976).
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cept that the delivery of the summons and complaint to the
officer or agency as required by the rules may be made by certified mail beyond the territorial limits of the district in which
36
the action is brought.
Several courts have held that this section does not affect personal
jurisdiction, but merely provides venue "if, [and] only if,
jursidiction-personal and subject matter-otherwise exists."

37

Most courts, however, have concluded that section 1391(e) authorizes nationwide personal jurisdiction over federal officials
sued on a constitutional tort theory.3 8 But several have also imposed limitations on the statute's scope. Although one court held
section 1391(e) applicable to any defendant who was a federal of39
ficial at the time he allegedly committed unconstitutional acts,

6 This provision indisputably liberalizes venue requirements for suits against the government or its subdivisions. See S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), reprinted in
[1962] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 2784; H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1961).
37 United States ex rel. Rudick v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S.
918 (1969). Accord, Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 870-71 (N.D. Cal. 1976);
Montilla v. Laird, 336 F. Supp. 1063, 1065-66 (D.P.R. 1971).
" See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v.
Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 9-10 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
granted sub norm. Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979); Blum v. Morgan Guar. Trust
Co., 539 F.2d 1388, 1391 (5th Cir. 1976); Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d
1379, 1382 (2d Cir. 1970) (dictum); Rabiolo v. Weinstein, 357 F.2d 167, 168 (7th Cir.
1966) (dictum), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 923 (1968); Crowley v. United States, 388 F. Supp.
981, 987 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Tenants and Owners in Opp. to Redev. v. United States Dep't
of HUD, 406 F. Supp. 1024, 1030 (N.D. Cal. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Froehlke, 348 F. Supp. 338, 364 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd on other grounds, 477 F.2d 1033
(8th Cir. 1973); United States ex reL Armstrong v. Wheeler, 321 F. Supp. 471, 476-77 (E.D.
Pa. 1970); United States ex rel. Lohmeyer v. Laird, 318 F. Supp. 94, 98-100 (D. Md. 1970);
Metz v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 207, 209 (W.D. Pa. 1969).
Congress could provide for nationwide service of process (see Mississippi Publishing
Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 442 (1946) (dictum)), subject only to a reasonable notice
requirement (see Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)).
The constitutionality of nationwide personal jurisdiction is less settled. Courts justify
nationwide jurisdiction under § 1391(e) on various grounds. See Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d
at 154 (personal jurisdiction constrained only by constitutional limits on service of process);
Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d at 8-10 (no constitutional limitation on congressional power to
grant personal jurisdiction to district courts); United States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435
F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (federal employees have sufficient minimum contacts
with United States to justify nationwide personal jurisdiction in federal court). Cf. Mariash
v. Morrill, 496 F.2d 1138, 1142-43 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying minimum contacts test to uphold personal jurisdiction acquired by nationwide service pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78aa
(1970)). See also R. FIELD, B. KAPLAN & K. CLERMONT, supra note 32, at 768-69.
11 See United States ex reL Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977);
cf. Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952, 962 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (analyzing § 1391(e) as
venue statute).
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the First Circuit disagreed in Driver v. Helms. 4° That court held
that the statute could not reach "those defendants who, at the
time [the] action was brought, were not serving the government in
the capacity in which they performed the acts on which their alleged liability is based." 41 The First Circuit anchored its decision
on a literal reading of the present tense verb in the statute, 42 refusing to depart from the statute's "plain meaning" because it was
not "absurd or plainly at variance with the policies of § 1391(e). 4 3
The court deemed insignificant the chance that federal officials
would resign their posts to escape section 1391(e). 4 But it failed
to consider the frequency of terminations or transfers in federal
employment for reasons unrelated to potential liability in lawsuits. 45 Unless a party files suit immediately upon violation of his
rights, he faces an appreciable possibility, steadily increasing with
time, that nonterritorial federal defendants will resign or transfer
and fall outside section 1391(e) under the Driver interpretation.
Courts would best serve the policies behind section 1391(e),
maximizing judicial economy and the relative convenience of the
40 577 F.2d 147 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. granted sub nom. Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct. 1015
(1979).
41 577 F.2d at 151. Cf Lamont v. Haig, 590 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (analyzing
§ 1391(e) as venue statute); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 876-77 (N.D. Cal.
1976) (analyzing § 1391(e) as venue statute); Wu v. Keeney, 384 F. Sup . 1161, 1168
(D.D.C. 1974), aff'd mem., 527 F.2d 854 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (analyzing § 1391(e) as service of
process provision). This exclusion encompasses officials who are no longer employed by
the United States or who no longer work within the same department or agency. The court
reached no decision concerning officials who were promoted within the same department
subsequent to committing the purportedly unconstitutional acts. 577 F.2d at 149-50, 151
n.ll.
42 577 F.2d at 149-50. In addition, the court argued that "there is a clear indication in
the legislative history that Congress did not mean to reach at least those former officials
who have moved away from Washington," and, in a footnote, quoted from the House
Report:
"This bill is not intended to give access to the Federal courts to an action
which cannot now be brought against a Federal official in the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia." . ... Prior to 1962 (when the bill was
passed) former officials who had moved away from Washington would not have
been subject to suit in Washington.
Id. at 150 & n.10. Absent even a hint in the legislative history that Congress considered the
problem of former employees, this argument is mere sophistry.
43 Id. at 150.

Id.
45 From October 1976 through September 1977, an estimated 650,707 federal
employees, or approximately 23% of the federal civilian workforce, either left government
service or transferred between agencies. See Letter, supra note 31. Since only 200-300 suits
are pending against federal officials at any given time (see note 145 infra), it seems unlikely
that a significant number of these employees were fleeing § 1391(e).
44
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parties, 4 by applying the statute to former officials. Unless a
single district court has personal jurisdiction under state law over
all former federal employees, Driver would require a plaintiff to
litigate the same claim several times. But multiple litigation inconveniences plaintiffs and burdens courts. 47 In contrast, the United
States provides counsel and bears the cost of defending Bivenstype suits, 48 and it can conveniently defend suits anywhere in the
country.4 9 Justice Department representation reduces individual
defendants' involvement to a minimum. In short, applying section
1391(e) to former officials seriously encumbers no one and avoids
inconvenience for both plaintiffs and the judiciary.
In a second holding, the Driver court interpreted section
1391(e) expansively by applying it to officials sued in their personal capacities. 50 Although some courts had limited the statute
to official capacity suits,5 Driver's result better comports with the
statute's legislative history. Congress intended section 1391(e) to
apply "in an action against a Government official seeking damages
•. for actions which are claimed to be without legal authority but
which were taken by the official in the course of performing his
duty."

52

Section 1391(e) has also been subjected to a number of singular interpretations. Courts have held that this provision expanded
personal jurisdiction only over officials who would have been sub46 S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.

& AD. NEws 2784, 2786.
"' Multiple litigation also opens the door to possible defensive use of collateral estoppel
against the plaintiff. See generally Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Ill. Found., 402
U.S. 313 (1970).
48 See note 171 infra. The regulations authorizing Justice Department representation of
federal employees expressly apply to former officials. 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a) (1978).
49 See S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2784, 2786.
50 577 F.2d at 151-54. Accord, Misko v. United States, 77 F.R.D. 425, 428, constitutional
claim dismissed on grounds of intramilitaryimmunity, 453 F. Supp. 513 (D.D.C. 1978); United
States ex rel. Garcia v. McAninch, 435 F. Supp. 240, 244 (E.D.N.Y. 1977); cf. Briggs v.
Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (analyzing § 1391(e) as venue statute), cert. granted
sub nom. Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979).
"' See Kenyatta v. Kelley, 430 F. Supp. 1328, 1330 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Writers Guild of
America West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F. Supp. 1064, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (dictum); cf. Paley v.
Wolk, 262 F. Supp. 640, 643 (N.D. Ill. 1965) (analyzing § 1391(e) as venue provision), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 963 (1967).
52 S. REP. No. 1991, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1962), reprinted in [1962] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2784, 2786; H.R. REP. No. 536, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1961).
The text of section 1391(e) also supports Driver; it applies to officials who allegedly
acted "under color of legal authority." This phrase ordinarily signifies constitutional tort
actions. 577 F.2d at 151-54. See also note 19 supra.
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ject to suit in the District of Columbia 53 or who were nominal
defendants in suits essentially against the United States. 54 One
court restricted section 1391(e) to mandamus actions; 55 another to
executive-branch employees.5 6
The difficulty of establishing personal jurisdiction over outof-state federal officials may rob deserving plaintiffs of a judicial
remedy. State statutes may not reach far enough. Most courts
agree that section 1391(e) expands the amenability of federal officers to suit, but they limit the scope of the statute in diverse
ways. 57 If neither state law nor section 1391(e) provides a single
district with in personam jurisdiction over all defendants, plaintiff
must eliminate some of his adversaries or file several suits. Either
option debilitates Bivens by deterring the litigation of meritorious
claims or decreasing the compensatory effectiveness of recoveries.5 8
3. Statute of Limitations
The Supreme Court has never indicated what statute of limitations controls Bivens-type cases. Only six lower federal courts
have faced the issue; all applied a limitations period governing

53
54
"
"

See Rimar v. McCowan, 374 F. Supp. 1179, 1181-82 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
See Macias v. Finch, 324 F. Supp. 1252, 1255 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
See Davis v. FDIC, 369 F. Supp. 277, 279 (D. Colo. 1974).
See Liberation News Serv. v. Eastland, 426 F.2d 1379, 1382-84 (2d Cir. 1970).
5 The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in two cases posing § 1391(e) issues
and may bring uniformity to the interpretation of the statute. See Colby v. Driver, 99 S. Ct.
1015 (1979), granting cert. to Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978); Stafford v.
Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979), granting cert. to Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d I (D.C. Cir.
1977).
58 If plaintiff decides to sue only those officials amenable to suit in a single jurisdiction,
he risks his claim on that suit. But he buys a pig in a poke; prior to trial he has no formal
technique to aid him in selecting the defendants most likely liable. If plaintiff loses, the
statute of limitations may prevent him from pursuing other defendants. Moreover, if he
continues to seek compensation, that loss routes him into multiple litigation.
If plaintiff gambles on multiple litigation, however, defendants in each suit might
whipsaw him by blaming their absent fellows for the loss of plaintiff's rights. Plaintiff also
risks defensive use of collateral estoppel. See note 47 supra. Moreover, because attorneys'
fees are rarely awarded (see note 135 infra), the added expense of duplicative litigation
decreases the net recovery available.
Consolidating pretrial proceedings under the multidistrict litigation statute (28 U.S.C.
§ 1407 (1976)) might mitigate these added costs. But plaintiffs rarely succeed in obtaining
substantial settlements; only a full trial offers any real chance for full compensation. See
notes 150-170 and accompanying text infra. Pretrial consolidation, therefore, remains far
from balsamic.
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analogons causes of action in the forum state. 5 9 In three of the
six cases, however, courts sitting in New York disagreed over what
state action most resembled a constitutional tort claim.
In Ervin v. Lanier,6 0 a district court found that two state limitations periods potentially applied to a Bivens-type complaint
charging an unconstitutional arrest: the one-year period for intentional torts6 1 or the three-year period for liabilities created by
statute.6 2 The court had concluded that the three-year provision
governed plaintiff's Civil Rights Act claims against nonfederal defendants. 6 3 It applied the same limitations period to the Bivenstype claim against federal officials 6 4 to preserve similar treatment
6 5
for common-law and statutory constitutional tort actions.

11 See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,438 U.S. 907
(1978); Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1977); Cole v. Kelley, 438 F. Supp.
129, 137 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1301 (D.D.C. 1976);
Felder v. Daley, 403 F. Supp. 1324, 1325 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Ervin v. Lanier, 404 F. Supp.
15, 20 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
Similarly, outside the Bivens context courts commonly turn to state law if a federal
cause of action lacks a corresponding statute of limitations. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975) (42 U.S.C. § 1981); UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704-05 (1966) (Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v.
Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 463 (1947) (National Bank Act); Campbell v. City of Haverhill,
155 U.S. 610, 613-21 (1895) (Patent Act); Swan v. Board of Higher Educ., 319 F.2d 56, 59
(2d Cir. 1963) (42 U.S.C. § 1983). But see cases cited in Lehmann, supra note 5, at 545-47.
A federal common-law limitations period may be fashioned if the need for national
uniformity or the nature of the protected federal right demands it. See, e.g., McAllister v.
Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958). Bivens-type cases apparently do not satisfy
these criteria. See Regan v. Sullivan, 557 F.2d at 303, 307. Certainly no court has fashioned
such a federal period for a Bivens-type claim.
60 404 F. Supp. 15 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
61 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 215(3) (McKinney 1972).
62 Id. § 214(2).
13 404 F. Supp. at 19-20. The court applied the three-year provision to plaintiff's
claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1970). Plaintiff's § 1986 claim was barred by its
internal limitations period.
11 404 F. Supp. at 20. The court noted that, despite the similarity to § 1983 actions, a
Bivens-type cause of action does not give rise to liability under a statute and applying the
three-year period to Bivens-type suits strained the language of the limitations statute. Even
the three-year period, however, barred the Bivens-type claim. Id.
65 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), under which plaintiff brought one Civil Rights Act claim,
creates a cause of action for violations of constitutional rights by state and local officials.
Courts view § 1983 as a statutory counterpart of Bivens and look to § 1983 caselaw when
deciding unresolved issues in federal constitutional tort cases. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou,
98 S. Ct. 2894, 2907-10 (1978); Green v. Carlson, 581 F.2d 669, 673 (7th Cir. 1978);
Rodriguez v. Ritchey, 539 F.2d 394, 399 (5th Cir. 1976), modified en banc, 556 F.2d 1185
(1977), cert. denied, 434, U.S. 1047 (1978); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 871 (3d Cir.
1975); Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th Cir. 1975); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1346 (2d Cir. 1972).
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Felder v. Daley 6" was decided four days later. Occupants of an
apartment filed a Bivens action against federal and local law enforcement officers for damages resulting from an entry and
search allegedly violative of the fourth amendment.6 7 The court
held that the claim against the federal officer sounded in intentional tort and applied the one-year statute of limitations rejected
68
in Ervin.
In Regan v. Sullivan,"9 plaintiff alleged federal officials had
unconstitutionally arrested and detained him.7 0 The district
court rejected Felder's intentional tort limitations period on the
ground that constitutional torts were not really analogous to
common-law intentional torts. 7 ' The Regan court also rejected
Ervin, arguing that the three-year period applied only to
genuinely statutory claims.72 The court found instead that plaintiff's claim resembled suits against sheriffs, and applied another
73
subsection of the one-year statute.
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed that the intentional tort
limitations period was not germane,7 4 but rejected the one-year
statute because the policy justifying such a short period, protection of indemnifying municipalities, did not extend to federal officials.7 5 Nor did the court relish the prospect of a case-by-case
determination of the analogy between particular federal defendants and various types of state officials; suits against different
classes of officials implicated different New York statutes.7 1' The
court concluded that Bivens-type actions were controlled by either
77
Ervin's three-year period or the six-year catch-all provision,
neither of which had run. 8
66 403 F. Supp. 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).

67 Id. at 1326.
68 Id. The one-year statute barred the claim as to the adult plaintiffs. The statute was
tolled as to the infant plaintiffs, but the court dismissed their complaint against the federal
agent for failure to prosecute. Id. at 1326-27.
69 417 F. Supp. 399 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), modified, 557 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1977).
70 417 F. Supp. at 401.
71 Id.

at 403.
72 Id. at 402-03. Ervin, like Regan, was decided in the Eastern District of New York.

The Regan court justified its departure from precedent by characterizing the Ervin rule as
dictum. Id. at 403.
73 417 F. Supp. at 403-04. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 215(1) (McKinney 1972) barred the
claim.
74 557 F.2d at 304.
75 Id. at 307.
76 Id.
77 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 213(1) (McKinney 1972).
78 557 F.2d at 307.
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Although superficially a question of law, selecting the most
accurate state analogy for limitations purposes turns on a question
of fact. For example, if state statutes distinguish among defendants according to their official duties, a court must inquire into
the federal official's functions. If the defendant's intent affects the
state limitations period, a court must investigate his state of mind.
Ad hoc decisions may result, and plaintiffs cannot anticipate
which statute a court will apply.7 9 Unless a court has ruled that
as a matter of law only one state statute applies to Bivens-type
actions, 80 each suit faces the time bar without certainty.
4. Amount in Controversy

Section 1 3 31(a) provides subject-matter jurisdiction for
Bivens-type cases. 8 1 Prior to 1976, its $10,000 amount in controversy requirement 82 hindered many deserving plaintiffs. 83

71 See Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 97, 99.
80 See Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331, 335-38 (7th Cir. 1977) (applying Illinois
catch-all limitations statute to Bivens-type action because all specific statutes inapplicable
and catch-all provisions govern Civil Rights Act suits), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978).
Regan probably represents a similar approach, although there the court found it unnecessary to choose between two limitations statutes. See notes 74-78 and accompanying text
supra.

Bivens' compensatory purpose should inform a court's selection of an applicable state
statute or its computation of a federal common-law period. Cf. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (borrowed state limitations period must comport with
policies underlying federal statutory cause of action). Because constitutional misconduct
often impairs intangible rights without causing any physical harm (see note 84 and accompanying text infra), a plaintiff may recognize his injury only tardily. Difficulties in identifying and locating proper defendants (see notes 22-29 and accompanying text supra; note 31
supra) may further impede the filing of a suit. Moreover, many Bivens-type cases arise out
of officials' conduct during criminal investigations. If plaintiffs have to file suit quickly,
their right to obtain informatio; through discovery may well conflict with the government's
need to maintain secrecy until criminal proceedings terminate. See Regan v. Sullivan, 557
F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1977). Therefore, courts should hesitate to apply a limitations
period so short as to regularly bar compensable Bivens-type claims.
" See note 14 supra.
82 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) (amended in 1976).
'3 State courts may also adjudicate Bivens-type actions. Sixth Camden Corp. v. Township of Evesham, 420 F. Supp. 709, 728 (D.N.J. 1976) (dictum). But cf. Gabaldon v. United
Farm Workers Organizing Comm., 35 Cal. App. 3d 757, 762 n.4, 111 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206
n.4 (1973) (dictum) (Bivens "probably cannot be invoked here because ... the remedy is a
federal court remedy"), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974). Whether state courts provide a
viable alternative to a federal forum is unknown. A review of the reported decisions of
California, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New York, and Texas yielded no constitutional
tort suits against federal officials. Federal courts are more appropriate for Bivens-type suits
(see notes 95-98 and accompanying text infra). They may also offer plaintiffs procedural
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Deprivations of constitutional rights often cause minimal tangible
harm. Frequently plaintiffs could meet the jurisdictional amount
only by appraising the worth of the violated right itself.8 4 Courts
developed no less than seven standards for evaluating the amount
in controversy in cases alleging constitutional injury.8 5 For example, some decided that plaintiffs could not value constitutional
rights in monetary terms and therefore could not satisfy the
$10,000 requirement. 8 Other courts applied the legal certainty
test. 87 Still others held that alleging the loss of constitutional
88
rights was sufficient in itself to meet the jurisdictional amount.
In 1976, Congress amended section 1331(a) to dispense with
the amount in controversy requirement "in any such action
brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity." 89 But it omitted
an "under color of legal authority" clause, the phrase commonly
used to denote personal damage actions.9 0 Because Bivens-type
cases are directed against officials in their personal capacities, 91
advantages, for example, the availability of both state long-arm statutes and, in most jurisdictions, § 1391(e) to acquire personal jurisdiction over defendants (see notes 31-38 and
accompanying text supra).
8 See Lehmann, supra note 5, at 551-57; Note, supra note 5, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. at 363.
For a complete discussion of the pre-1976 judicial approaches to the § 1331 (a) jurisdictional amount in suits to vindicate constitutional rights, see Lehmann, supra note 5, at
551-57. See also Comment, The JurisdictionalAmount in Controversy in Suits to Enforce Federal
Rights, 54 TEx. L. REv. 545, 559-69 (1976).
8" See, e.g., Kheel v. Port of New York Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.) (action for
declaratory judgment), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 983 (1972); Goldsmith v. Sutherland, 426 F.2d
1395, 1397 (6th Cir.) (action for injunction), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 960 (1970).
87 See, e.g., Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282, 1287 n.1 (D.D.C. 1976); Gardels v.
Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389, 1398 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
The Supreme Court enunciated the legal certainty rule in St. Paul Mercury Indem.
Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938):
The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the
federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by
the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must
appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional
amount to justify dismissal.
Id. at 288-89. (footnotes omitted).
88 See, e.g., Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931-32 (10th Cir.

1975).
89 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has noted that
"[t]he obvious effect of this modification ... is to confer jurisdiction on federal courts to
review agency action .... " Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977).
90 See note 52 supra.
91 Depending on the remedy plaintiff contemplates, he may sue a federal official in

either his official or his individual capacity. If plaintiff seeks to hold an official liable for
acts committed under color of legal authority and to recover damages from the official's
personal fortune, he sues the defendant in his personal capacity. However, '"if the decree
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the amendment probably does not exempt them from the jurisdictional amount requirement.9 2
Unfortunately, the amount in controversy requirement, designed to keep "petty controversies" out of federal court, 93 inaccurately screens Bivens-type suits. Because constitutional tort cases
center on nonpecuniary rights, the amount in controversy should
be irrelevant to judging the propriety of federal court jurisdiction.9 4 Several factors suggest that federal courts should freely

would operate against" the sovereign, ... or if "the judgment sought would expend itself
on the public treasury or domain, or interfere with the public administration",.., or if the
effect of the judgment would be "to restrain the Government from acting, or to compel it
to act,"' he seeks relief from the defendant in his official capacity. Gnotta v. United States,
415 F.2d 1271, 1277 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970). See also H.R. REP.
No. 1936, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1960) (letter of Deputy Attorney General Lawrence
Walsh); 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3655,
at 175-80 (1976). The "relief aspect" of sovereign immunity creates this distinction; courts
may not award damages in an action against an official in his official capacity absent waiver
of the government's immunity. Huntington Towers, Ltd. v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 559 F.2d
863, 869-70 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978); NcNutt v. Hills, 426 F. Supp.
990, 999-1000 (D.D.C. 1977).
An exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity allows plaintiff to sue an official
in his official capacity for allegedly unconstitutional acts. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 701-02 (1949). One court has applied this exception in a
Bivens-type action for money damages (J.D. Pflaumer, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Justice,
450 F. Supp. 1125, 1132 (E.D. Pa. 1978)), but the Supreme Court takes the better view,
limiting it to actions for specific relief. See Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 621-22 (1963);
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. at 701-02; McNutt v. Hills, 426
F. Supp. at 1001; D SCHWARTZ & S. JACOBY, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
§§ 16.105 (1970).
The court's treatment of Clarence Kelley in Burkhart v. Saxbe, 397 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (opinion on motion to dismiss), 448 F. Supp. 588 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (opinion on
cross motions for summary judgment), illustrates the distinction between personal and official capacity. Plaintiff, alleging she was the subject of illegal and unconstitutional electronic
surveillance, sued several defendants; Kelley, in both his personal capacity and his official
capacity as director of the F.B.I., was among them. 397 F. Supp. at 501. The purported
misconduct occurred more than two years before Kelley took office. Since Kelley did not
participate in the operation of the wiretaps, the court could not hold him liable for money
damages in his personal capacity. 448 F. Supp. at 607. In his official capacity, however,
Kelley was a proper defendant. Injunctive relief was available; Kelley could exercise the
powers of his office to provide that relief. 397 F. Supp. at 602.
92 But cf. Fayerweather v. Bell, 447 F. Supp. 913, 915 (M.D. Pa. 1978) (applying 1976
amendment without specifying the capacity in which officials were sued).
93 See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958), reprinted in [1958] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3099, 3101.
94 See Lehmann, supra note 5, at 555-57; Comment, supra note 5, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW.
at 555-57; Comment, supra note 85, at 545-46. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS § 1311 (a) &
commentary, at 172-76 (Official Draft 1969); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 122-26 (3d ed. 1976).
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admit Bivens-type cases. 95 They are more practiced at constitutional adjudication than state courts.9 6 Federal law governs most
issues in Bivens-type cases 97 and state remedies may inadequately
98
redress federal constitutional torts.
The jurisdictional amount requirement does not plague section 1983 suits, 9 9 the state-official counterparts of Bivens-type
claims.' 0 0 Indeed, it rarely applies to any federal question
case. 1 1 Nevertheless, the requirement keeps Bivens-type actions
out of federal court. 10 2 The anomaly is evident.
5. Individual Immunity
Various immunity doctrines protect federal officials from liability in Bivens-type suits. A judge enjoys absolute immunity from
actions for money damages unless he acted nonjudicially and "in
the clear absence of all jurisdiction." 13 The doctrine has im9 See generally Weschler, FederalJurisdictionand the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAw
& CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 225-26 (1948).
96 The federal judiciary has implicitly acknowledged the propriety of adjudicating

Bivens-type claims without reference to jurisdictional amount requirements. Most judicial
standards for testing the claimed amount in controversy effectively repealed the $10,000
requirement. See Lehmann, supra note 5, at 554-55.
97 See notes 182-183 and accompanying text infra.
98 The Bivens majority, for example, considered state law both insufficient to fully vindicate fourth amendment rights and potentially inconsistent with fourth amendment
policies. 403 U.S. at 390-95.
99 See 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1976).
100 See note 65 supra.

101 Nearly all federal question cases fall within special jurisdictional statutes that require
no minimum amount. See C. WRIGHT, note 94 supra, at 122-26. Suits against federal officials to enforce federal rights comprise the only major class of cases that clearly remain
subject to the jurisdictional amount requirement. See id. at 125-26.
102 See Table B infra.

103 Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57, 360 (1978). Although Stump involved a
state judge, the Court probably envisioned an identical standard for federal judges. The
majority held that "the governing principle of law" had been established a century earlier
in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), an action against a federal judge.
Bradley's jurisdictional test, to which the Stump Court added the judicial act requirement,
has been applied indiscriminately to both state and federal judges. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray,
386 U.S. 547, 553-54 & n.9 (1967) (dictum) (Bradley's absolute immunity available to state
judges in § 1983 actions). The policies underlying judicial immunity, preservation of the
integrity and independence of judicial decisionmaking (see 435 U.S. at 355 (quoting Bradley)), clearly cut across political divisions. Cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 500 (1978)
("there is no basis for according to federal officials a higher degree of immunity from
liability when sued for a constitutional infringement ... than is accorded state officials
when sued for the identical violation").
Protected judicial acts are identified by considering "the nature of the act itself, i.e.,
whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and ... the expectations of the
parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity." 435 U.S. at 362.

686

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:667

munized a judge who ordered a demonstrator expelled from a
courthouse corridor 1 4 and judges who allegedly violated plaintiff's constitutional rights during a securities fraud conviction and
a bankruptcy proceeding. 5
Similarly, prosecutorial immunity frustrates many Bivens-type
actions.1 s 6 Courts historically have granted absolute immunity to
prosecutors sued for acts performed within the scope of their
duties.1 0 7 Some have refined this doctrine and allowed absolute
immunity only where a prosecutor acted as an advocate, rather
than an investigator or administrator.10 8 But even when courts
deny absolute immunity, they generally permit prosecutors to
raise an official immunity argument. 0 9
In the Bivens context, official immunity is the most significant
immunity doctrine because every defendant may claim its protection. The doctrine has undergone considerable evolution." 0 Initially, in Barr v. Matteo,"' the Court accorded officials absolute
immunity from liability predicated on "discretionary acts at those
levels of government where the concept of duty encompasses the

Lowery v. Hauk, 422 F. Supp. 490, 491-93 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
105 Smallwood v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 398, 402-04 (E.D. Mo.), aff'd mem., 486
F.2d 1407 (8th Cir. 1973).
106 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Moore v. Koelzer, 457 F.2d 892 (3d Cir. 1972) (prosecutor allegedly falsified evidence and solicited perjury); Human Eng. Inst. v. Abbott,
77-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
9,671, at 88255-56 (N.D. Ohio 1977) (I.R.S. attorneys instituted tax
evasion prosecution); Lofland v. Myers, 442 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (prosecutor allegedly suborned perjury, withheld evidence, introduced false evidence, acquiesced in illegal search and seizure); Carlsberg v. Gatzek, 442 F. Supp. 813 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (S.E.C.
attorneys allegedly sought injunction without notice, filed affidavit containing false statements, publicly made false statements, advised plaintiff's debtors to stop making payments);
Blassingame v. United States Atty. Gen., 387 F. Supp. 418 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (prosecutor
allegedly breached agreement to exchange payment and parole for false testimony).
1"7 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 509-10 (1978) (dictum); Yaselli v. Goff, 12 F.2d
396 (2d Cir. 1926), aff'd per curiam, 275 U.S. 503 (1927).
108 See Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1978); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d
83, 91-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Immunity may exist even where the rationale for the doctrine
does not. In Daniels, the trial court refused absolute immunity to a prosecutor sued by a
prosecution witness, reasoning that fear of liability, although it might affect the prosecutor's decision to indict, would not have restrained his choice of witnesses. Daniels v.
Kieser, 446 F. Supp. 1160 (N.D. Ill.
1978). Ignoring this policy-oriented approach, the
Seventh Circuit reversed. Daniels v. Kieser, 586 F.2d 64, 68-69 (7th Cir. 1978).
10 See, e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. granted sub nom.
Stafford v. Briggs, 99 S. Ct. 1015 (1979); Helstoski v. Goldstein, 552 F.2d 564, 566 (3d Cir.
1977); Daniels v. Kieser, 446 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 n.3 (N.D. Ill.), rev'd on other grounds, 586
F.2d 64 (7th Cir. 1978); Williams v. Wright, 432 F. Supp. 732, 741 (D. Ore. 1976).
110For a discussion of the development of the immunity doctrines, see Freed, supra note 5.
111 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
104
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sound exercise of discretionary authority.""12 In Scheuer v.
Rhodes,1 13 the Court reduced the protection afforded state officials
in section 1983 suits:
[I]n varying scope, a qualified immunity is available to officers
of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the
office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared at
the time of the action on which liability is sought to be based. It
is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at
the time and in light of all the circumstances, coupled with
good-faith belief, that affords a basis for qualified immunity of
executive officers for acts performed in the course of official
14
conduct."

After Scheuer, lower courts quarrelled over the appropriate immunity standard for federal officials charged with violating the
Constitution." 5 The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in Butz
v. Economou:1

6

[I]n a suit for damages arising from unconstitutional action,
federal executive officials exercising discretion are entitled only
112

Id. at 575 (footnote omitted).

113416 U.S. 232 (1974).
n, Id. at 247-48.
The Court subsequently rearticulated this standard:
[A state official] is not immune from liability for damages under § 1983 if he
knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took within his
sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of the
[plaintiff], or if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights ....
Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975). See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S.
555, 561-62 (1978); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975).
5 A handful of courts retained absolute official immunity. See, e.g., Jackson v. Plate,
76-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9395, at 84,206 (E.D. Mich. 1975); Green v. Cauthen, 379 F. Supp.
361, 374-77 (D.S.C. 1974). But see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 495 (1978) ("Barr did
not purport to protect an official who ...also violated those fundamental principles of
fairness embodied in the Constitution.").
Others held that federal officials enjoyed only qualified immunity unless their responsibilities were so discretionary that they warranted absolute protection from liability. See,
e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011, 1013-15 (10th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); State Marine Lines, Inc. v. Shultz, 498 F.2d 1146, 1158-59 (4th
Cir. 1974); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1347 (2d Cir. 1972).
Many other courts offered federal officials only qualified immunity. See Ervin v. Ciccone, 557 F.2d 1260, 1262 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); Weir v. Muller, 527 F.2d 862, 872
(5th Cir. 1976); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d. Cir. 1975); Mark v. Groff, 521
F.2d 1376, 1379-80 (9th Cir. 1975); Apton v. Wilson, 506 F.2d 83, 90-94 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
Tritsis v. Backer, 501 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1974).
116438 U.S. 478 (1978).
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to the qualified immunity specified in Scheuer, subject to those
exceptional situations where it is demonstrated that absolute
11 7
immunity is essential for the conduct of the public business.
The Butz Court acknowledged the tension between the im-

munity doctrines and Bivens: plaintiffs deserve compensation for
violations of their constitutional rights by federal officials, but the
public interest demands shielding governmental decisionmakers
from civil liability.' 1 8 Qualified immunity attempts to accommodate these competing interests. Most courts condition immunity
upon defendant's affirmative showing that he acted with a
reasonable, good-faith belief in the lawfulness of his conduct. 1 19

117 Id. at 507 (footnote omitted). In dicta, the Court endorsed absolute judicial immunity

and prosecutorial immunity for advocacy activities. Id. at 508-12. Because Butz presented
only common-law immunity issues, the decision does not affect constitutional protection of
legislators. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6. Legislative immunity has thwarted plaintiffs in at
least two Bivens-type cases. See Doe v. McMillan, 566 F.2d 713 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 969 (1978); McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (en banc) (per curiam).
"s 438 U.S. at 506. Official immunity is usually justified on three grounds. It avoids the
unfair punishment of an official for performing a duty delegated to him, and perhaps
required of him, by law. It diminishes any deterrent effect the threat of liability might have
on the entry into and vigorous performance of public service. Finally, defending lawsuits
requires expending time and energy; immunity minimizes this distraction from attending
to public affairs. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-40 (1974); Gregoire v. Biddle,
177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950); Freed, supra note 5, at
529-30.
The latter two justifications relate directly to the public interest. The unfairness
rationale seems to focus on the official's interest. But under general tort principles, liability
for damages rests on a failure to perform legally imposed duties properly. See W. PROSSER,
supra note 22, at 324-26. To argue that liability in Bivens-type cases is unfair to defendants
is to argue by analogy against the settled law of torts. The unfairness rationale is more
easily defended as a component of the deterrence justification; the unfairness may contribute to the chilling effect on accepting and fearlessly performing public duties.
119 See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 498 (1978) (dictum); Dellums v. Powell,
566 F.2d 167, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 3146 (1978); Skehan v. Board of
Trustees, 538 F.2d 53, 61-62 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 979 (1976); McCray v.
Burrell, 516 F.2d 357, 370 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 426 U.S. 471 (1976); Smith v.
Losee, 485 F.2d 334, 342 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 908 (1974); Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339, 1347-48 (2d Cir.
1972).
The First and Seventh Circuits apparently place the burden of proof on plaintiffs. See
Hanneman v. Breier, 528 F.2d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 1976) ("damages are appropriate only if
plaintiffs prove defendant's bad faith"); Palmigiano v. Mullen, 491 F.2d 978, 980 (Ist Cir.
1974) ("plaintiff must also show that he is prepared to prove the defendants' bad faith or
at least such a degree of neglect or malice ...as to deprive defendants of official immunity.").
The Fifth and Eighth Circuits vacillate. Compare Landrum v. Moats, 576 F.2d 1320,
1329 (8th Cir. 1978) ("like other affirmative defenses ....the burden is on the defen-
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Because such qualified immunity issues involve questions of fact,
courts should almost never summarily dispose of constitutional
tort suits.' 2 0 Every plaintiff should have an opportunity to establish a compensable claim.
Nevertheless, in practice Bivens-type actions rage hopelessly
against qualified immunity. Most jurisdictions have emasculated
Scheuer's discretion component, once a limit on immunity, and
have made the reasonableness and good faith of defendant's belief in the propriety of his conduct the controlling issue.' 2' On
dant"), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 282 (1978); and Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th
Cir. 1974) (approving jury instruction that plaintiff need only show state action depriving
him of his rights in § 1983 action), vacated on other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), with
Goodman v. Parwatikar, 570 F.2d 801, 805 (8th Cir. 1978) ("to recover damages [plaintiff]
must also establish the requisite knowledge or malice of the defendants") and Hander v.
San Jacinto Junior College, 519 F.2d 273, 277 n.1 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum) (defendant "is
not personally liable for damages under § 1983 unless the plaintiff can establish a 'malicious intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights' ").
120 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n.13 (1976). The Imbler court observed:
"An absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions were
within the scope of the immunity. The fate of an official with qualified immunity depends
upon the circumstances and motivations of his actions, as established by the evidence at
trial." Id.
121 At common law, governmental employees were immune from suit for discretionary,
but not for ministerial acts. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 988-91. Courts treated acts as
discretionary for Barr purposes (see text accompanying note 112 supra) if they resulted
from "a judgment or decision which it is necessary that the ... official be free to make
without fear or threat of vexatious or fictitious suits and alleged personal liability ..
" Ove
Gustavsson Contracting Co. v. Floete, 299 F.2d 655, 659 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 827 (1963). The circularity of this definition made discretion the sole operative criterion for determining absolute official immunity. Discretion was the litmus for courts choosing between absolute and qualified immunity during the Scheuer-Butz interregnum. See note
115 supra.
Scheuer explicitly conditioned qualified immunity upon the scope of the defendant's
discretion. See text accompanying note 114 supra. The Fifth Circuit considers the defendant's range of discretion in setting the standard for judging the reasonableness of his belief
that he had not violated plaintiff's rights. See Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256, 1266 (5th
Cir. 1978); Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1214 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 865
(1976).
Other circuits may infrequently allude to the discretion component of the Scheuer
standard (see, e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 872 (3d Cir. 1976) (dictum)), but they
usually analyze only the good-faith and reasonableness of defendant's belief. See Princeton
Community Phone Book, Inc. v. Bate, 582 F.2d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1978) (dictum), cert.
denied, 99 S.Ct. 454 (1978); Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 10, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011, 1015
(10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673,
678-79 (7th Cir. 1976); White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077, 1080 (4th Cir. 1976); Jones v.
United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1039 (1977); Economou v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture, 535 F.2d 688, 696 (2d Cir. 1976), vacated sub nom. Butz
v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 908-09 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
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motions for summary judgment, plaintiff is rarely in a good position to counter defendant's affidavit that he acted reasonably and
in good faith. Courts regularly decide or assume that defendants
violated plaintiff's rights, but grant summary judgment for the
officials or dismiss the complaint on qualified immunity
grounds. a2 This result guts Bivens.
6. Damages
Courts disagree about what damages Bivens-type plaintiffs
may recover. Some circuits allow both punitive and compensatory
damages, 1 23 but one has prohibited the former.' 2 4 The Supreme
Court recently settled this question for actions under
section 1983,
1 25
Bivens' statutory counterpart for state employees.
In Carey v. Piphus,'1 26 plaintiff sued public school officials for
actual and punitive damages resulting from an alleged violation of
their procedural due process rights.' 2 7 A unanimous1 28 Court
held that, absent proof of actual injury, only nominal damages of
one dollar or less are appropriate where important procedural
Although the Ninth Circuit expressly contends that the degree of discretion exercised
by the defendant is irrelevant under Scheuer (Omnibus Fin. Corp. v. United States, 566
F.2d 1097, 1101 (9th Cir. 1977)), most courts have merely redefined "discretion" as "within
[an official's] sphere of ... responsibility." Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 322. See also
Cordeco Dev. Corp. v. Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256, 260 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 978
(1976); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d at 271. The concept of discretion still has content.
But since a defendant must act under color of legal authority to be liable on a Bivens-type
theory, this redefinition robs the discretion requirement of any limiting !effect on the enjoyment of immunity in the constitutional tort context.
122See, e.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 560 F.2d 1011, 1015 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978); White v. Boyle, 538 F.2d 1077, 1080 (4th Cir. 1976)
(dictum); Jones v. United States, 536 F.2d 269, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1039 (1977); Midwest Growers Coop. Corp. v. Kirkemo, 533 F.2d 455, 464 (9th Cir. 1976);
Brubaker v. King, 505 F.2d 534, 538-39 (7th Cir. 1974); Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc.
v. Sackheim, 451 F. Supp. 1189, 1193-95 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For principled analyses leading
to denial of summary judgment motions on qualified immunity grounds, see, e.g., Askew v.
Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673, 679-80 (7th Cir. 1976); Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F. Supp. 1282,
1294-97, 1299-1300 (D.D.C. 1976).
123 See, e.g., Paton v. La Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 871-72 (3d Cir. 1975) (dictum); Alvarez v.
Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136, 143-44 (N.D. Il1. 1977); Stokes v. United States Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 393 F. Supp. 24, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dictum).
124 See Dellums v. Powell, 566 F.2d 167, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S.
916 (1978); Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1977). But cf. Hartigh v.
Latin, 485 F.2d 1068, 1072 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("punitive damages ... are to be included in
the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes"), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 948 (1974).
12 See note 65 supra.
126 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
127 Id. at 250. Plaintiffs claimed they were suspended from school without procedural

due process.
128 Justice Blackmun did not participate.
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rights are violated.1 29 Although it specified no precise "quantum
of proof required to support a particular damages award where
actual injury is proved," 130 the Court refused to presume that
damages result from procedural due process violations,' 3 1 reasoning that "neither the likelihood of such injury nor the difficulty of
proving it is so great as to justify awarding compensatory damages
without proof that such injury actually was caused." 132 The
Court noted that section 1983, like Bivens, is designed to compensate constitutional injuries.13 3 Nevertheless, the Court continued,
"[t]his is not to say that exemplary or punitive damages might not
be awarded in a proper case under § 1983 with the specific purpose of deterring or punishing violations of constitutional rights,"
for example if the defendant officials had "act[ed] with a malicious intention to deprive [plaintiffs] of their rights or to do them
134
,,
other injury .
If courts apply Carey's analysis to Bivens-type cases, plaintiffs
will have available a wider range of damages. 1 35 Compensatory
damages are uncontroversial. Few judges will deem a lost constitutional right so trivial that it would not support an award of nominal damages. Punitive damages are appropriate if defendants
acted with malice or intent, or if the unconstitutional conduct was
1 36
otherwise egregious.
129 Id. at 266-67.
130 Id. at 267 n.25.

131 Id. at 259-65. The Court left open the question whether damages for violations of
substantive rights, such as the right to vote, might properly be presumed. See id. at 264
n.22.
132 Id. at 264.

133 435 U.S. at 254-55.

134Id. at 257 n. 11. In Carey, however, the district court "specifically found" no such
malicious intention. Id.
135 Attorneys' fees are a form of recovery still typically unavailable in Bivens-type cases.
A court may award attorneys' fees only if a statute authorizes reimbursement of plaintiff's
expenses, if plaintiff's suit confers a common benefit on a definable class, or if a defendant
willfully disobeys a court order or acts in bad faith. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 257-59 (1975). No federal statute sanctions attorneys' fees
in Bivens-type actions. Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 562 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1977). A Bivens-type suit contemplates remedying a
specific instance of constitutional misconduct, and will rarely provide a general benefit to a
class. See Tatum v. Morton, 386 F. Supp. at 1316 (summarily concluding that constitutional
tort suit failed to qualify as "benefit to the class" case). Unless the defendant defies the
court or acts in bad faith, therefore, plaintiffs may not recover attorneys' fees.
136 Cf. Mawson v. Winans, No. 77-365 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 1978) (awarding punitive
damages in § 1983 action against state prison official for striking inmate and offering
reward for inmate's murder). Punitive damages may not be inconsistent with Bivens' compensatory purpose. Since plaintiffs face difficulties in proving actual losses (see note 84 and
accompanying text supra), punitive damages may ameliorate deficiencies in compensatory
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7. Jury Verdict
In Bivens-type suits, critical questions of liability, immunity,
and damages lie within the province of the jury. 13 7 For a Bivenstype plaintiff, however, the jury itself may be an undeserved obstacle. Plaintiffs in constitutional torts suits frequently compare
unfavorably with defendants in the eyes of jurors.' 8 A law enforcement agent or prison official probably will evoke more sympathy from a jury than will the victim of his allegedly unconstitutional acts, typically an inmate or accused lawbreaker. Moreover,
defendants can magnify this disparity by informing the jury that
any damages it awards will come out of the pocket of an overworked, underpaid official.1 3 9 Only with difficulty will a plaintiff
wrest a substantial award from a hostile jury.
8. Recovery
Most federal civil servants are judgment-proof; 140 they earn
too little to pay substantial judgments.' 4' Moreover, plaintiffs orawards. To the extent that a deterrence rationale underlies Bivens, a punitive award is
appropriate. In any event, courts should be more comfortable with assessing punitive damages than they are with the less familiar task of valuating constitutional rights.
137See In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 746 n.12 (D.C. Cir 1977) (per curiam); Meiners v.
Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343, 348-50 (7th Cir. 1977); Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note
17, at 535.
38 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 421-22 (1971) (dictum) (dissenting opinion, Burger, C.J.); Dellinger, supra note 5, at
1553; Satlin, ConstitutionalLaw: Search and Seizure: An Alternative to the Exclusionary Rule, 26
J.A.G. J. 255, 259-60 (1972); 10 DuQ. U.L. REV. 710, 714 (1972); 62 GEo. L.J. 1771, 1778
(1974); 46 TULANE L. REV. 816, 820-21 (1972); 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 686, 689. Cf. Foote,
Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 499, 500-01
(1955) (local officials).
A recent study of § 1983 suits against local police officers indicated that jurors were
biased against constitutional tort plaintiffs. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88
YALE L.J. 781 (1979). The Project documented juror bias against nonwhite plaintiffs, those
with unusual lifestyles, and those with prior criminal records. Id. at 794-99. On the other
hand, jurors were favorably disposed toward the defendant police officers. Id. at 800-02.
The jury selection process aggravated these biases. Id. at 806-09.
139 See Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1977); Newman, Suing the
Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section 1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447, 456 (1978).
140 See S. REP. No. 588, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2789, 2790; S. REP. No. 469, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1973) (individual
views of Senator Percy); Dellinger, supra note 5, at 1553; Comment, Accountability for Government Misconduct: Limiting Qualifled Immunity and the Good Faith Defense, 49 TEMPLE L.Q.
938, 972 (1976); 39 BROOKLYN L. REV. 943, 954-55 (1973); 10 DuQ. U.L. REv. 710, 714-15
(1972); 24 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 1003 (1973); 46 TULANE L. REV. 816, 820 (1972); 1971
WASH. U.L.Q. 686-689; 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1353, 1357 (1974).
141 The Civil Service Commission estimates that as of October 1978, the mean annual
salary of full-time federal civilian employees was $18,131. The mean income of nonsuper-
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dinarily may not garnish federal employees' wages.1 4 1 Unless the
defendant owns substantial attachable property, therefore, judgment debts in constitutional tort cases will usually remain unsatisfied.
II
A

QUANTITATIVE OVERVIEW

The Bivens defendants argued that, in view of some of the
impediments discussed above, a constitutional tort cause of action
against federal officials would be futile.' 43 Justice Harlan disagreed, responding that "damages to some degree will be available
when the option of litigation is chosen." 144 Experience has
proven him wrong. The author surveyed 172 Bivens-type cases
seeking damages from federal officials. 1 4 5 Defendants won
nearly every case that went to judgment.

visory personnel, the class of officials most likely to be proper defendants in Bivens-type
actions (see notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra), was $17,187 for General Schedule
employees and $15,199 for Federal Wage System workers. See Letter, supra note 31.
142 See Buchanan v. Alexander, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 20 (1846); May Dep't Stores Co. v.
Smith, 572 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1978). A creditor may garnish federal wages only if the
employing agency is a governmental corporation engaged in commercial activity with the
public (see Federal Housing Admin. v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242, 245 (1940)) or if Congress has
waived the general prohibition against garnishment for that bureau (see May Dep't Stores
Co. v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147, 1147-48 (8th Cir. 1977)). Typically, neither exception
obtains in Bivens-type actions. The only instance where these exceptions are likely to apply
are cases against postal officials for aiding law enforcement officials in monitoring and
opening plaintiff's mail. See generally Driver v. Helms, 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert.
granted sub noa. Colby v. Driver, 47 U.S.L.W. 3482 (1979); Paton v. LaPrade, 524 F.2d 862
(3d Cir. 1975). The current trend permits garnishment of Post Office employees' wages.
See Goodman's Furniture Co. v. United States Postal Serv., 561 F.2d 462 (3d Cir. 1977);
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Williamson, 549 F.2d 1147 (8th Cir. 1977); Standard Oil Div. v.
Starks, 528 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1975).
143 Brief for Respondents at 25-32.
144 403 U.S. at 410 (concurring opinion).
145 This study selected cases from reported decisions by means of traditional and
computer-assisted research methods. Unfortunately, the total population of Bivens-type
cases can only be identified by examining the files of every district court clerk. See Letter of
John J. Farley, III, Assistant Director, Torts Branch, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Nov. 1, 1978) (on file at the Cornell Law Review); Letter of James A.
McCafferty, Chief of Statistical Analysis and Research Division, Administrative Office of
the United States Courts (Oct. 2, 1978) (on file at the Cornell Law Review); Letter of Sue
Walsh, Information Service, Federal Judicial Center (Oct. 23, 1978) (on file at the Cornell
Law Review). Random sampling is impossible without the total population. Rigorous statistical theory demands that analysis of a nonrandom sample be merely descriptive, eschewing
inferences regarding the total population. See generally D. HuFF, How TO LIE WITH STATISTICS 13, 21 (1954).
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TABLE

A

Final Disposition of Bivens-type Cases
1 46

Cases Against Federal Officials

Number

Percent of all
cases studied

Judgment for plaintiff
Judgment for defendant
Settlement
Final disposition pending
Status unknown

5
131
5
18
24

3
76
3
10
14

Total cases

172

100

Plaintiffs lost a sizeable number of cases on the merits, but over
twice as many on grounds unrelated to the merits. The immunity
doctrines and the proper defendant requirements constituted the
most significant bars to judgment for plaintiffs.

We believe, however, that this study accurately protrays the pro-defendant trend in
Bivens-type actions. The Justice Department reports that, as of November 1, 1978, "[s]uits
which have actually resulted in a judgment [for plaintiff] are extremely few in number,
perhaps six." See Letter of John J. Farley, supra. Excluding no relevant reported case, the
survey identified four (two-thirds) of these cases. See notes 150-67 and accompanying text
infra. We suspect that the survey did not find two-thirds of all Bivens-type cases, and so
picked up a smaller proportion of the total population than of judgments for defendants.
Because we drew cases from reported decisions, the study probably underincludes settlements and pending cases. Typically, 200-300 Bivens-type cases are pending. See STAFF OF
SUBCOMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
95TH CONG.,

2D SESS., JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RETENTION OF PRIVATE LEGAL COUNSEL TO

REPRESENT FEDERAL EMPLOYEES IN CIVIL LAWSUITS 1 (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter cited
as STAFF REPORT]; U.S. Backs Shift in Federal Tort Liability, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 4, 1978, at 4, col.
2.
After identifying the cases, we requested information regarding final disposition from
the clerks of the forum courts. We frequently obtained docket sheets and unpublished
opinions. A sample cover letter and questionnaire is on file at the Cornell Law Review. We
collected all information between October 1 and December 31, 1978, and have made no
attempt to update this data.
146 Cases that had reached final disposition, either in part or as a whole, are included in
Table A. The sum of the columns exceeds the total because some cases fit two categories.
If clerks failed to respond to our request for information, we included the affected cases in
the "Status unknown" category. See generally note 145 supra. A research memorandum
listing the cases included in each category is on file at the Cornell Law Review.
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B

Groundsfor Dismissal or Judgment
in Defendant's Favor 4 '
Number
No meritorious claim
No Bivens-type cause of
action
No constitutional violation

40

Grounds unrelated to merits
Proper defendant problems
Improper personal jurisdicdon or service of process
Insufficient jurisdictional
amount
Statute of limitations bar
Sovereign immunity bar
Individual immunity bar
Other 148

89
18

Relationship to merits
unknown
General verdict by jury
Insufficient pleadings
Other 49
Total judgments for
defendants

8
32

12
5
3
26
51
4
21
3
9
9
131

147 A research memorandum listing cases included in each category in Table B is on file
at the Cornell Law Review. The sum of each column exceeds the total because some cases fit
two or more categories. See generally note 145 supra.
148 The following cases below were dismissed on the following grounds:
9,326
1. improper venue-Smith v. Commissioner, 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(N.D. Ga. 1978); Kipperman v. McCone, 422 F. Supp. 860, 879 (N.D. Cal.
1976).
2. failure to exhaust administrative remedies-National Indian Youth
Council v. Morton, 363 F. Supp. 475, 479-80 (W.D. Okla. 1973).
3. improper removal from state court-Jacobson v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 566 F.2d 1353, 1362 (9th Cir. 1977).
149 The cases below were dismissed on the following grounds:
1. voluntary dismissal-Lowenstein v. Rooney, 401 F. Supp. 952 (E.D.N.Y.
1975), dismissed, No. 74C-593 (July 3, 1978); Black Panther Party v. Alexander,
9,376 (N.D. Cal. 1975), dismissed, No. 74-1247 (Feb. 27,
75-1 U.S. Tax. Cas.
1976); Green v. Laird, 357 F. Supp. 227 (N.D. Ill. 1973), dismissed, No. 72C2461 (Oct. 18, 1973).
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The relief awarded plaintiffs in their handful of victories has
varied considerably. In Saal v. Middendorf,'5" a homosexual
servicewoman whom the Navy had designated ineligible for reenlistment sought monetary and equitable relief for violation of
her due process rights.' 5 ' Although the court initially indicated
that damages might be available, 52 it ultimately granted only an
injunction. 5 3 Halperin v. Kissinger 5 4 held that the electronic surveillance of government employees by Nixon Administration officials violated plaintiff's constitutional rights. 5 5 The court awarded
only nominal damages of one dollar against each of the three responsible defendants. 5 6 In Tatum v. Morton,' 5 7 the court denied
punitive damages and limited compensatory damages to one
hundred dollars for each plaintiff who had been arrested during
a peaceful prayer vigil. The court limited the award because the
plaintiffs were participating in a demonstration and most refused
to post collateral in order to obtain release after being arrested.' 58 On plaintiffs' appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed the denial of punitive damages' 5 9 but reversed and remanded because the trial court erred in limiting the compensatory
recovery.' 60 In Dellums v. Powell,' 6 the jury awarded each of
many arrested anti-war demonstrators $7,500 for violation of first
amendment rights and $500 for cruel and unusual punish-

2. directed verdict for unspecified reasons-Mark v. Groff, 521 F.2d 1376
(9th Cir. 1975), dismissed, No. 73-871 (D.C. Cal. Oct. 12, 1977); Dry Creek
Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975), dismissed, No. 74-74
(D. Wyo. July 20, 1977).
3. failure to prosecute-Wounded Knee Legal Defense/Offense Comm. v.
F.B.I., 507 F.2d 1281 (8th Cir. 1974), dismissed, No. 73-5082 (D.S.D. May 14,
1976); Felder v. Daley, 403 F. Supp. 1324, 1326-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
4. by agreement--Gardels v. Murphy, 377 F. Supp. 1389 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
dismissed, No. 73-2336 (date unknown).
5. grounds for dismissal unknown-James v. United States, 358 F. Supp.
1381 (D.R.I. 1973), dismissed, No. 4670 (Aug. 14, 1974).
150 427 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
151 Id. at 194.
152 Id. at 203.
153 No. 73-1299 (N.D. Cal. May 6, 1977).
154 424 F. Supp. 838 (D.D.C. 1976) (opinion on liability), 434 F. Supp. 1193 (D.D.C.
1977) (opinion on damages).
155 424 F. Supp. at 843-45.
156 434 F. Supp. at 1195.
"' 386 F. Supp. 1308 (D.D.C. 1974).
158 Id. at 1313-14.
159 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
160

Id.

1'

566 F.2d 167 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 438 U.S. 916 (1978).
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ment.162 The total judgment for both common-law and constitutional torts in this class action suit against the District of Columbia
and individual officers was estimated at twelve million dollars. 6 3
The District of Columbia Circuit set aside the first amendment
damages as excessive and remanded the case to the jury to determine actual damages.' 6 4 The jury in Askew v. Bloemker,' 65 one of
the Collinsville raids cases,' 6 6 awarded $45,000, including $29,000
in punitive damages. Because of defendants' appeals, plaintiffs
have not recovered damages in any of these cases. 16 7 Plaintiffs'
68
success with settlements has been equally weak.'
Justice Harlan's remark, that for Bivens-type plaintiffs it is
"damages or nothing,"' 69 was ironically prophetic. In the cases
surveyed, a tiny proportion of plaintiffs obtained judgments or
settlements. Even in these cases, the magnitude of the injury and
the time and expense presumably necessary to secure compensation often seem to dwarf the sum awarded. 7
Most plaintiffs recovered nothing regardless of the merit of their claims. Bivens has
failed as a compensatory remedy.
III
A

REFORM PROPOSAL

The Supreme Court's recognition of a right to damages for
federal officials' constitutional torts has proven chimerical. Expos162 566 F.2d at 174 n.6.
163 Id. at 208 (concurring opinion, Leventhal, J.). One source reported that the United
States intended to pay all damages awarded against Powell, although it did not indicate
what empowered the government to do so. See 25 LAw ENFORCEMENT LEGAL LIAIiXrTY REP.
4 [AELE] (1975).
164 566 F.2d at 196.
165 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976),jury verdictforpltf, No. 73-79 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 1978).
166See note 17 supra.
167 See Letter of John J. Farley, supra note 145.
168 See Kudley v. Hollo, 431 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ohio 1976), dismissed, No. 76-838 (N.D.
Ohio Aug. 16, 1977) (stipulating that honorable discharge fully satisfied claim that activation of Army reservist without following regulations violated fourth and fifth amendments); VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974), dismissed, No. 70-1438 (N.D.
Cal. June 3, 1976) (stipulated dismissal with parties bearing own costs); State Marine Lines,
Inc. v. Schultz, 498 F.2d 1146 (4th Cir. 1974), dismissed, No. 73-8 (D.S.C. Nov. 19, 1975)
(settling Bivens-type claim that Treasury and Custom officials' seizure of cargo violated fifth
amendment for $12,000); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), dismissed, No. 67-C-655 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 1974) (settled for
$500); Scheunemann v. United States, 358 F. Supp. 875 (N.D. Ill. 1973), dismissed, No.
72-1934 (N.D. Ill. May 7, 1973) (dismissed pursuant to stipulation without any compensation for plaintiff).
169 403 U.S. at 410 (concurring opinion).
170 Attorneys' fees are rarely available in Bivens-type cases. See note 135 supra.
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ing the United States to liability in Bivens-type cases 171 would dissolve most extraneous obstructions to recovery in meritorious
suits. Unusual problems with subject-matter jurisdiction,1 7 2 personal jurisdiction and service of process,17 3 and statutes of limitations 1 7 4 would evaporate. At least at the pleading stage, plaintiffs
could satisfy the proper defendant requirements. 75 Extinguish171 For views favoring the abrogation of sovereign immunity, both generally and in the
constitutional tort context, see, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 410 (concurring opinion, Harlan, J.), 422-23 (dissenting
opinion, Burger, C.J.); Borchard, Governmental Immunity in Tort (pt. VI), 36 YALE L.J. I
(1926); Davis, Sovereign Immunity Must Go, 22 AD. L. REv. 383 (1970); Dellinger, supra note
5, at 1553-59; Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1963); James, Tort Liability of Governmental Units and Their Officers, 22 U. CHt. L.
REv. 610 (1955); Lloyd, Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi, 27 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 38 (1949);
Comment, Sovereign Immunity-An Anathema to the "Constitutional Tort," 12 SANTA CLARA
LAw. 543 (1972).
The Justice Department has advanced a novel rationale for waiving sovereign immunity in the constitutional tort context. The Department provides counsel to any federal
employee sued in his individual capacity if "[his] actions reasonably appear to have been
performed within the scope of his employment, and ... providing representation is in the
interest of the United States." 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a)(2) (1978). If more than one official is
sued in a given action, the Department may retain private counsel to represent the additional defendants in order to avoid conflicts of interest. Id. § 50.16. The incidence of private counsel is relatively low. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 145, at 935-43. Nevertheless, the
total annual cost of retaining private counsel has exceeded one million dollars. See U.S.
Backs Shift in Tort Liability, Nat'l L.J., Dec. 4, 1978, at 5, col. 4. If the United States were
solely liable for its employees' constitutional torts, of course, the Justice Department would
face no conflicts of interest, and public funds now spent for private counsel could be saved.
See Amendments to the Federal Tort Claims Act: Joint Hearings on S. 2117 Before the Subcomm. on
Citizens and Shareholders Rights and Remedies and the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and
Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1978) (statement of
Attorney General Griffin Bell) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
172 Section 1331 (a), providing subject-matter jurisdiction over Bivens-type cases, does not
impose a jurisdictional amount requirement on suits against the United States. See note 89
and accompanying text supra.
173 FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(4) provides for service
[u]pon the United States, by delivering a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is
brought or to an assistant United States attorney or clerical employee designated by the United States attorney in a writing filed with the clerk of the court
and by sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or
certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States ... , and in any
action attacking the validity of an order of an officer or agency of the United
States not made a party, by also sending a copy of the summons and of the
complaint by registered or certified mail to such officer or agency.
Plaintiffs can easily comply with this provision.
174 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (1976) mandates a six-year statute of limitations for civil suits
against the United States.
175 Plaintiff would initially meet the proper defendant requirement by suing the United
States. Whether plaintiff could continue to do so would depend on the vicarious liability
standard adopted for constitutional tort suits against the United States: common-law re-
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ing the threat of individual officials' liability would render the individual immunity doctrines superfluous. 1 7 Jury bias might well
diminish.' 7 7 Moreover, sovereign liability would guarantee a solvent defendant.
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) governs the liability of
the United States for a similar class of actions: torts arising under
state law.' 7 8 Thus, it appears to offer a handy mechanism for
waiving sovereign immunity in Bivens-type suits.' 79 Five bills in
the Ninety-fifth Congress,18 0 and two in the Ninety-sixth,' 8 ' proposed shifting liability for constitutional torts from officials to the
United States. But Congress should proceed cautiously in amending the FTCA to embrace Bivens-type actions. Under the FTCA,
"the law of the place where the act or omission occurred" determines the liability of the United States.' 82 Federal law governs

spondeat superior principles, as in FTCA cases (28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976)); or the "governmentall policy or custom" standard applicable in § 1983 suits against municipalities (see
Monell v. Department of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Respondeat superior
would better effectuate Bivens' compensatory purpose, since it would require plaintiffs to
prove nothing more than that a federal official violated plaintiff's constitutional rights
while performing his duties. Moreover, respondeat superior would best deter unlawful
conduct. See note 22 supra.
176 See generally note 118 supra. Cf. Newman, supra note 139, at 457-58 (discussing state
officials). The specter of defending a lawsuit may also chill an official's zeal in performing
his duties. But waiving sovereign immunity for constitutional torts would demote the offending employee from defendant to witness. Both his visibility and his involvement in any
suit would diminish, thereby reducing any adverse impact. Deterrence theorists, concerned
that sovereign liability would eliminate the sole disincentive to unconstitutional conduct by
officials, insist that administrative accountability procedures be fortified before absolving
individual employees from liability. See STAFF REPORT, supra note 145, at 26-27.
177 A statute waiving sovereign immunity for constitutional tort suits might well prohibit
trial by jury. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2402 (1976) (no jury trial in FTCA and Tucker Act suits
against the United States). Even if cases were tried to a jury, however, the government's
deep pocket would generate less sympathy than the officials' shallow ones.
178 The FTCA also governs intentional fourth amendment violations (see note 17 supra),
but they, being sui generis, will be ignored in this analysis.
179 See, e.g., 24 HASTINGS L.J. 987, 1004 (1973).
180 H.R. 13793, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 124 CONG. REC. H8126 (daily ed. Aug. 8,
1978); S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 124 CONG. REc. Si1048 (daily ed. July 18,
1978); S. 2868, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), 124 CONG. REc. S5193 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 1978);
S. 2117, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in Senate Hearings, supra note 202, at 39-47;
H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. (1977). For an earlier proposal, see H.R. 10439, 93d
Cong., ist Sess. (1973), reprinted in Federal Tort Claims Amendments: Hearings on H.R. 10439
Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-6 (1974).
181 See S. 695, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 193, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
182 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672 (1976). Federal causes of action fall outside the FTCA.
See Birnbaum v. United States, 588 F.2d 319, 327 (2d Cir. 1978) (constitutional torts);
Baker v. F & F Inv. Co., 489 F.2d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 1973) (Civil Rights Act); Devlin
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Bivens-type actions 1 83 and Congress should not attempt to harmonize constitutional torts with those currently cognizable under
the FTCA by consigning them to state law. 1 8 4 The laws and
courts of different states might treat similarly injured plaintiffs
nonuniformly. 185 Although tolerable where plaintiffs sue on
state-created rights, nonuniform treatment of federal constitu86
tional rights is unacceptable.1
Congress might stretch the FTCA to encompass a federal rule
of decision for constitutional torts. 87 Different vicarious liability
principles,' 8 8 defenses, 18 9 immunity standards, 19 and damage
rules'91 would apply to an FTCA state tort theory and an FTCA
Lumber & Supply Corp. v. United States, 488 F.2d 88, 89 (4th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(Miller Act); Davis v. United States, 395 F. Supp. 793, 795-97 (D. Neb. 1975), aff'd per
curiam, 536 F.2d 758 (8th Cir. 1976) (OSHA). But see Somerset Seafood Co. v. United
States, 95 F. Supp. 298, 305-06 (D. Md.), aff'd, 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951) (ship's sinking,
caused by government's breach of statutory duty to mark wrecked vessels, actionable under
FTCA) and cases cited in note 18 supra.
183 Federal law provides the rule of decision, although courts may occasionally borrow
state law, for example, in the statute of limitations context (see text accompanying note 59
supra).
184 One bill made precisely this attempt. See H.R. 13793, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. sec. 3, 124
CONG. REc. S 11048 (daily ed. July 18, 1978).
185 Compare Birnbaum v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 967, 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (permitting, under New York law, recovery of damages for mental distress resulting from constitutional tort), aff'd, 588 F.2d 319 (2d Cir. 1978) with Hetrick v. Willis, 439 S.W.2d 942, 943
(Ky. 1969) (no damages for mental distress unless accompanied by physical contact or injury). Federal law compensates mental distress resulting from constitutional misconduct. See
text accompanying note 132 supra.
18 See Boger, Gitenstein & Verkuil, supra note 17, at 521-22.
187This proposal has been made. See, e.g., H.R. 9219, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., secs. 1, 2
(1977).
188 Respondeat superior, generally available in state tort cases (see W. PROSSER, supra note
22, at 458-67), is inapplicable in Bivens-type cases (see notes 22-23 and accompanying text
supra).
18 A variety of defenses available in state tort suits (see W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at
98-138, 416-57) may have no counterpart in constitutional law. The Bivens Court itself
offered an example:
[Allthough the Fourth Amendment confines an officer executing a search warrant strictly within the bounds set by the warrant, ... a private individual lawfully in the home of another will not normally be liable for trespass beyond the
bounds of his invitation absent clear notice to that effect.
403 U.S. at 394-95 n.7 (citations omitted).
190 Federal officials enjoy absolute immunity from state torts, but only qualified immunity from constitutional torts. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 483-90, 494-95, 507-08
(1978); Granger v. Marek, 583 F.2d 781, 784 (6th Cir. 1978); Evans v. Wright, 582 F.2d
20, 21 (5th Cir. 1978). The United States may assert its employee's immunity defense in an
FTCA suit. See note 19 supra.
191 Courts should tailor damage awards to the interest protected by the cause of action.
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 (1978). The interests safeguarded by state and
constitutional tort claims may differ. For example, the trespass cause of action protects the
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92
constitutional tort theory arising out of the same set of facts.'
Characterizing both types of theories as "FTCA claims," however,
might blind some judges and juries to the distinctions; confusion,
93
fallacious analogies, and incorrect decisions could result.'
Moreover, other FTCA provisions disserve Bivens' compensatory purpose. Unhappily, the Act prohibits punitive damages. 9 4
The FTCA's two-year time bar 195 might prematurely exclude
meritorious Bivens-type cases.' 9 6 The discretionary act exception
clashes with a goal of remedying constitutional misconduct.' 97 Finally, in the interest of efficient claim administration,' 9 8 the
FTCA requires that before filing suit, a plaintiff must obtain final

possessory interest in land. See W. PROSSER, supra note 22, at 68. The fourth amendment
guarantees a personal privacy interest, the "absolute right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures carried out by virtue of federal authority." Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. at 392; Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967).
192 For example, S. 3314 provided that:
1. federal instead of state law would be the rule of decision for constitutional tort claims (secs. 1, 2(a));
2. plaintiffs could recover minimum liquidated damages in constitutional
tort suits, but not in state tort claims (sec. 3(b));
3. with few exceptions, the United States could not assert its employee's
individual immunity defenses in constitutional tort actions, although immunity
for state tort claims would remain intact (sec. 3(b));
4. constitutional tort claims could be brought as class actions, without similar provision for state tort actions (sec. 4(b));
5. the state tort remedy against the United States would be exclusive of a
remedy against the official, whereas the constitutional tort claim against the
United States would be exclusive of a claim against the official (sec. 6);
6. different standards would govern substitution of the United States for
individual employees in state and constitutional tort suits (sec. 7);
7. investigatory and disciplinary proceedings would lie against employees
whose actions result in a constitutional tort, but not state tort, liability against
the government (sec. 8); and
8. constitutional tort suits would be excluded from § 2680's exceptions to
the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity (sec. 9(a)).
S. 3314 would create exceptions for constitutional tort actions in seven of the eleven basic
FTCA provisions (28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80).
191 Even congressional draftsmen get confused. S. 3314, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978),
provides in sections 1 and 2(a) that the government's "liability [is] to be determined in
accordance with applicable Federal law." In section 3(b), however, the bill states, "The
United States shall be liable ... to the same extent as entitlement to compensation is recognized under the tort law of the place where the violation complained of occurred."
194 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1976).
195 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
196 See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
197 See note 19 supra.
"' Efficient claim administration results from expeditious settlement procedures and
avoidance of unnecessary litigation. See S. RxP. No. 1327, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 4 (1966),
reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2515, 2516, 2518.
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administrative disposition of his claim from the agency whose
employee caused the injury.1 9 9 Unfortunately, agencies lack special expertise in constitutional law. 20 0 They may also be reluctant
to admit liability. Thus, agency review might merely delay satisfaction of meritorious claims without significantly easing the judicial
caseload. 201 These factors militate against incorporating a federal
constitutional tort cause of action into the FTCA.
CONCLUSION

An uncommon array of obstacles thwarts deserving plaintiffs
in Bivens-type suits. Sovereign immunity bars most claims against
the United States. If the plaintiff sues individual officials, acquiring personal jurisdiction over defendants who reside outside the
forum jurisdiction may be problematic. Plaintiffs usually cannot
anticipate what statute of limitations applies to their claim. Bivenstype actions, unlike nearly every other federal question case, may
be foiled by a jurisdictional amount requirement. Liability extends
only to officials who directly participate in constitutional misconduct, but even offending officials may escape through individual
immunity doctrines. Some jurisdictions have limited the types of
damages available. Unsympathetic juries impede recovery. Finally,
even if the plaintiff wins, most federal officials are judgmentproof.
In practice, Bivens offers no remedy at all. Plaintiffs have won
only a handful of cases; most lose on grounds unrelated to the
merits of their claims. Congress has considered waiving sovereign
immunity for constitutional tort cases, a salutary reform. These
proposals, however, would utilize the Federal Tort Claims Act, a
vehicle ill-suited to the task. Instead, to ensure compensation of
deserving plaintiffs, a discrete statutory scheme governing Bivenstype actions should be enacted. While this scheme should parallel
the FTCA in many ways, Congress must tailor a constitutional tort
claims act so that it avoids the FTCA's pitfalls and maximizes the

199 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1976).
200 Fairchild, Arabatzis & Smith, Inc. v. Sackheim, 451 F. Supp. 1181, 1186 (S.D.N.Y.

1978) (refusing to require exhaustion of administrative remedies prior to adjudication of
constitutional tort suit in absence of congressional directive).
201 Statistical data on the current effectiveness of administrative review as a means of
settling meritorious claims without litigation are unavailable.
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incidence and adequacy of compensation of meritorious Bivens20 2
type claims.
W. Mark Smith

202

Merely waiving sovereign immunity, without accompanying procedural and substan-

tive provisions, probably would not significantly increase compensation of deserving plaintiffs. Section 1983, an appropriate barometer (see note 65 supra), has had indifferent success. See Ginger & Bell, Police Misconduct Litigation-Plaintiff's Remedies, 15 AM. JUR. TIALS
555, 580-90 (1968) (in 17 years, only 54 reported § 1983 cases were settled, or proceeded
past a motion to dismiss); 5 U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGrrs, JUSTICE: 1961 COMMISSION
ON CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT 116; Project, supra note 138, at 786-789 (out of 149 § 1983 cases
against Connecticut police officers, plaintiffs won only 7 of 28 cases that were tried before
a jury, with an average award of $5,723). Cf. INTERNATIONAL CITY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION, PUBLIC OFFICIAL LIABILITY: 1976 (Urban Data Service Report, May
1977), analyzed in P. BROWN, PERSONAL LIABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY, AND COMPENSATION FOR Loss, Feb. 1977, at 5-6 (Law & Ethic Series No. 1) (without
discriminating between types of suits, survey shows 74% of suits against state and county
officials decided in their favor).

